Time preferences and risk aversion: Tests on domain differences by unknown
J Risk Uncertain (2016) 53:29–54
DOI 10.1007/s11166-016-9245-8
Time preferences and risk aversion: Tests on domain
differences
Christos A. Ioannou1 ·Jana Sadeh1
Published online: 12 December 2016
© The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Understanding how individuals discount and evaluate the risks of environ-
mental outcomes is a prime component in designing effective environmental policy.
We use an incentivized experimental design to investigate whether subjects’ time
preferences and risk aversion across the monetary and environmental domains dif-
fer. We find that subjects’ time preferences are not significantly different across the
two domains. In contrast, subjects exhibit a higher degree of risk aversion in the
environmental domain. Furthermore, we corroborate earlier results, documenting that
women are more risk averse than men in the monetary domain, and show this finding
to also hold in the environmental domain.
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1 Introduction
The design and evaluation of environmental policy requires the incorporation of time
and risk elements, as many environmental outcomes extend over long time periods
and involve a large degree of uncertainty. Understanding how individuals discount
and evaluate risks with respect to environmental outcomes is a prime component in
designing effective environmental policy to address issues of environmental sustain-
ability, such as climate change. Our objective in this study is to investigate whether
subjects’ time preferences and risk aversion across the monetary domain and the
environmental domain differ.
We elicit subjects’ time preferences and risk aversion using a controlled ‘within-
subject’ experimental design. First, to isolate the effect of domain on intertemporal
choices, we use the fixed-sequence choice titration (Harrison and Lau 2005; Read
et al. 2005; Andersen et al. 2008; Hardisty and Weber 2009). In this approach, sub-
jects are presented with a series of binary intertemporal choices between a fixed
amount that is due at one point in time (henceforth referred to as smaller sooner)
and a larger amount that is due at a later point in time (henceforth referred to as
larger later). While the smaller sooner amount is kept fixed, the larger later amount
increases successively. In the beginning, subjects typically prefer the smaller sooner
amount to the larger later one. However, at some point, a switch takes place from the
smaller sooner to the larger later amount, which enables the experimenter to extract
the discount-rate bracket within which the individual’s rate of time preference lies.
Second, to elicit subjects’ risk aversion, we use a variant of the Eckel-Grossman test
(Eckel and Grossman 2002, 2008), where subjects are presented with five gambles
of varying riskiness and are required to select the one they prefer. Crucially, in order
to ensure that the magnitude of the choices in the monetary domain matched those in
the environmental domain, prior to running the experimental sessions, we calibrated
the value of the environmental instrument using two contingent valuation studies.
Finally, we use the Cognitive Reflection Test and a questionnaire to obtain a measure
of subjects’ cognitive ability to reflect and deliberate in the face of intuitively simple
alternatives as well as insights into subjects’ environmental attitudes, which could
possibly relate to the way different domains are evaluated.
A novelty of the experimental design is that it is incentivized: in the monetary
domain, time preferences and risk aversion are elicited with real monetary payoffs,
whereas in the environmental domain, we elicit time preferences and risk aversion
using real (bee-friendly) plants.1 Our choice for the appropriate environmental instru-
ment was not an easy one. The instrument had to be familiar to subjects to facilitate
their understanding of its potential benefits, and credible so that subjects could rest
assured that the project is one that can be easily implemented without arousing
1There exists evidence to suggest that incentivized experiments may have an impact on the discount rates
elicited (Coller and Williams 1999; Kirby and Marakovic´ 1995). In fact, Andersen et al. (2014) claim “ ...
the evidence is overwhelming that there can be huge and systematic hypothetical biases” (p. 27).
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suspicion of deception. Finally, the instrument had to be divisible in order to enable
us to vary the larger later amount and the gambles. The choice of a locally-based
project that distributed bee-friendly plants fulfilled all these requirements.2
Our first set of main results does not find any significant differences in subjects’
time preferences across the monetary and environmental domains. Assuming away
any philosophical or ethical issues that might dictate what the discount rate ought
to be in environmental cost-benefit analysis, a corollary of the first result is that the
same discount rate used for financial payoffs should also be used for the environ-
mental ones when evaluating environmental policies. This corollary is reassuring to
economists and policy makers who, for some time now, have been evaluating envi-
ronmental policies with discount rates that are based on the intertemporal-choice
framework of the monetary domain.
Our second set of main results finds domain differences in subjects’ risk aversion.
More specifically, subjects (men and women) exhibit a higher degree of risk aversion
in the environmental domain relative to the monetary domain; that is, individuals tend
to be more reluctant to take on large gambles with environmental outcomes than with
monetary ones. A plausible explanation for the emergence of domain differences in
risk aversion could be stemming from individuals’ perception on the consequences of
climate change—a topic that has been well publicized. Furthermore, we corroborate
existing results, which document that women are more risk averse than men in the
monetary domain. We show this finding to also hold in the environmental domain.
The latter findings seem to hint that women are more risk averse than men in most
domains. In fact, this conjecture finds support in the study of Weber et al. (2002) who
show that women are more risk averse than men in four domains (financial decisions,
health/safety, recreational, ethical), but not in the domain of social decisions. The
authors attribute this pattern of results to gender differences in the perception of risk.
Finally, our third set of results finds no correlation between subjects’ time pref-
erences and their risk aversion within a domain. Given that part of the motivation
for discounting future outcomes is that an element of risk is introduced by the time
delay, one would expect some moderate correlation between the two decision types
within a domain. However, this is not the case. Moreover, we do not find any support
of the hypothesis that time preferences or risk aversion are correlated with subjects’
cognitive abilities or environmental awareness.
The paper adheres to the following plan. We present next an overview of the
related literature. Section 3 describes, in relative detail, the experimental design.
Section 4 presents the data analysis, and Section 5 discusses the important findings
and provides direction for future research.
2 Literature review
Our paper is related to two main strands of the literature on decision-making across
domains. First, it is related to the growing literature on domain differences in time
2To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to use a real environmental instrument; the only other
study that we are aware of that investigates differences in time preferences across the monetary and the
environmental domains used hypothetical environmental payoffs (Hardisty and Weber 2009).
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preferences. The impact of domains on intertemporal choice has predominantly
revolved around the monetary domain and the health domain, where most studies
find differences in subjects’ discounting behavior.3 Recently, in the midst of a pub-
lic debate on the appropriate discount rate to evaluate the consequences of climate
change (Stern 2007; Nordhaus 2007),4 the investigation on the impact of domains on
intertemporal choice has expanded to also include the environmental domain. In their
study, Hardisty and Weber (2009) compare intertemporal choices elicited in the three
aforementioned domains and find that subjects’ discounting behavior is not statis-
tically different across the environmental and monetary domains, but is statistically
different across the health domain and the other two domains. Hardisty and Weber
(2009) attribute the domain effect in health to subjects’ visceral reaction to the health
scenarios. Other studies have also assessed the discounting behavior of subjects in
the environmental domain albeit via risk assessments. Bo¨hm and Pfister (2005), for
example, conduct experiments to measure subjects’ risk assessment of hypothetical
scenarios on coastal erosion and marine oil spills. The authors find that temporal dis-
counting of environmental risks is weak and postulate that ethical evaluations are not
discounted by subjects. Along the same lines, Gattig and Hendrickx (2007) conclude
that temporal discounting is less pronounced for environmental risks than for risks
in other domains. Finally, Viscusi et al. (2008) estimate discounting rates based on a
series of environmental policy choices administered in a survey context. A key find-
ing of their study is that discounting behavior differs markedly for people who visit
lakes, rivers and streams for recreational purposes versus those who do not. More
specifically, regular visitors to water bodies have low discounting rates, whereas
those who do not visit water bodies often have consistently high discounting rates.
Our work is also related to the literature on risk preferences across domains. Weber
et al. (2002) look at respondents’ choices in various domains and find differen-
ces in risk taking across domains. However, the authors attribute these differences to
different perceptions of the risks in those domains rather than differences in attitude
towards those perceived risks, which they find to be remarkably consistent across
domains. In a more recent study, Dohmen et al. (2011) use a large, representative sur-
vey of the German population to elicit risk preferences across a number of domains
and find that the self-reported, risk-taking measures are highly, but not perfectly,
correlated across domains.5 Finally, in a study with a different flavor, Riddel (2012)
compares subjects’ evaluation of financial and environmental lotteries to deter-
mine whether preferences over environmental risks can be reasonably approxi-
mated by the Expected Utility framework. The author finds that subjects are more
3Many studies find that discount rates in the health domain are larger than those in the monetary domain
for health gains, but lower than those in the monetary domain for health losses (Cairns 1992; Chapman
and Elstein 1995; Madden et al. 1999).
4As Weitzman (2007) aptly notes, “it is not an exaggeration to say that the biggest uncertainty of all in the
economics of climate change is the uncertainty about which interest rate to use for discounting” (p. 705).
5Dohmen et al. (2011) test the following domains: career choices, leisure and recreational activities, finan-
cial decisions, health and driving. They use a scale from 1 to 10, with 10 signifying the greatest willingness
to take risks.
J Risk Uncertain (2016) 53:29–54 33
likely to overemphasise low probability, extreme environmental outcomes than low
probability, extreme financial ones. As a result, she concludes that the Expected
Utility framework is likely to underestimate subjects’ willingness to pay for environ-
mental cleanup programs or policies with uncertain outcomes.
All the aforementioned studies that pertain to the environmental domain use an
elicitation method based on hypothetical environmental gains and losses. In sharp
contrast, our study uses an incentivized scheme with real monetary and environ-
mental payoffs. The use of real payoffs creates a strong incentive for subjects to
display their true preferences and increases the attention given to the task at hand.
There is evidence that the use of real payoffs might matter in discounting experi-
ments. For instance, Kirby and Marakovic´ (1995) find that discount rates elicited for
real monetary payoffs are higher than those elicited for hypothetical ones. Testing
a similar setting, Coller and Williams (1999) are less conclusive in their findings,
while Camerer and Hogarth (1999), in a wide survey on the role of real incentives,
find no effect on mean performance albeit they find a reduction in variance with
high financial incentives. The authors note that high incentives improve performance
in demanding tasks and reduce generosity and risk-seeking behavior. The effect of
incentives is also confirmed in other studies investigating the impact of real payoffs
in experiments (Kroll et al. 1988; Cummings et al. 1995).
3 Experimental design
Our experimental setup featured six tasks. Two of these tasks aimed to investigate
subjects’ intertemporal choices across the monetary domain and the environmental
domain. The two tasks differed solely on the instrument that was discounted; that is,
the valuation of the two instruments was identical (see Section 3.2). In the monetary
domain, the instrument that was discounted was money, whereas in the environ-
mental domain the instrument that was discounted was plants. To isolate the effect
of domain on intertemporal choices, we used the fixed-sequence choice titration
(Harrison and Lau 2005; Andersen et al. 2008; Hardisty and Weber 2009; Andersen
et al. 2014).6 In this approach, subjects are presented with a series of binary choices
between a fixed amount that is due at one point in time and a larger amount that
is due at a later point in time. While the smaller sooner amount is kept fixed, the
6Other studies (Raineri and Rachlin 1993; Green et al. 1994) have used the staircase choice titration
method. The latter method presents subjects with an initial binary intertemporal choice that dynami-
cally adapts the subsequent choices depending on the subject’s decisions. Finally, a third method is the
matching-tasks method (Kirby and Marakovic´ 1995; Chapman 1996; Cairns and van der Pol 1999), where
subjects are asked to indicate what amount they would require in order to postpone the receipt of a given
outcome by a given time delay. In essence, this method asks subjects to reveal directly the upper bracket
of their indifference point. However, Hardisty et al. (2013) note that choice-based measures, such as the
fixed-sequence choice titration and the staircase choice titration, are better predictors of real world out-
comes than matching tasks. Additionally, the authors point out that the demanding dynamic staircase
titration offers no advantages over the simpler fixed-sequence choice titration, making the latter the most
appropriate method for this experiment.
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larger later amount increases successively. The experimental data on the repeated
binary intertemporal choices are transformed into a single switching point; the latter
produces a discount-rate interval, which contains the indifference point of each sub-
ject. Another two tasks aimed to measure the risk aversion of subjects across the
monetary domain and the environmental domain. The tests on risk aversion were
based on the Eckel-Grossman test (Eckel and Grossman 2002, 2008) and differed
only on the measurement instrument. Analogous to the previous setup, in the mone-
tary domain, the test used monetary gambles, whereas in the environmental domain,
the test used gambles in plants. In addition to the four aforementioned tasks, subjects
were required to take the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) and to complete a ques-
tionnaire. On one hand, the CRT allowed us to obtain a measure of subjects’ cognitive
ability to reflect and deliberate in the face of intuitively simple alternatives. On the
other hand, the questionnaire allowed us to elicit subjects’ environmental attitudes.7
In summary, the addition of the latter two tasks served to provide insights into possi-
ble individual heterogeneity that could be related to the way different domains were
evaluated by subjects.
Our experimental design applied a hybrid of a ‘within-subject’ and ‘between-
subject’ design (Charness et al. 2012). In line with a standard ‘within-subject’ design,
each subject was exposed sequentially to the six tasks. We safeguarded against the
possibility of observing order effects by splitting the sample into four subsamples
(A1, A2, B1 and B2). The four subsamples differed only in the order the first four
tasks were presented (i.e. the monetary discounting task, the monetary risk aversion
test, the environmental discounting task and the environmental risk aversion test),
thereby replicating a ‘between-design’ for these four tasks. This allowed us to har-
ness the strength of each design while safeguarding against possible confounds. The
experimental design is indicated in Table 1. In Panel A, we provide a brief descrip-
tion of the task and the corresponding acronym. In Panel B, we display the order of
the tasks in the four subsamples.
3.1 Environmental instrument
Our choice for the appropriate environmental instrument was not an easy one. We
required an instrument that was divisible so we could vary the larger later amount
and the gambles. The instrument had to be familiar to subjects to facilitate their
understanding of its potential benefits as well as credible so that subjects could rest
assured that the project is one that can be easily implemented and would not suspect
the experimenter of deception. The choice of a locally-based project that distributed
bee-friendly plants fulfilled all these requirements. Subjects were instructed that bee-
friendly plants would be handed out to staff and students on campus to be placed
in outdoor areas. Given the different delay periods, different bee-friendly plants
were chosen. Subjects were informed that the plants distributed would be chosen
depending on the season to ensure that they are immediately beneficial.
7The questions were taken from the Segmentation Model created by the Department for Environment,
Food & Rural Affairs DEFRA (2008).
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Monetary Risk Aversion Test MRAT
Environmental Discounting ED
Environmental Risk Aversion Test ERAT




Stage A1 A2 B1 B2
1 MD MRAT ED ERAT
2 MRAT MD ERAT ED
3 ED ERAT MD MRAT
4 ERAT ED MRAT MD
5 CRT CRT CRT CRT
6 Q Q Q Q
# of Subjects 31 31 27 29
# of Sessions 2 2 2 2
Notes: In Panel A, we provide a brief description of the task and the corresponding acronym. In Panel
B, we display the order of the tasks in the four subsamples. The last 2 tasks were common in all four
subsamples. The first four tasks (MD, MRAT, ED and ERAT) were shuffled across the four subsamples.
The last two rows display the total number of participants and the number of sessions in each subsample
The environmental project was described in a succinct and neutral manner. The
link between bee-friendly plants and the positive externality they generate was stated
in the description. We also stated the fact that bee populations are in decline. These
two facts are central to the positioning of the project as an environmentally beneficial
one. A total of 63 plants were distributed in the experiment. The full description of
the project is reported in the Online Appendix.
3.2 Valuation of a bee-friendly plant
In order to ensure that the magnitude of the choices in the monetary domain matched
that of the choices in the environmental domain, prior to the experimental sessions,
we calibrated the value of a bee-friendly plant using two contingent valuation stud-
ies carried out at the University of Southampton.8 Subjects participating in these
studies were given the same project description that was used in the experimental
sessions.
8It is well documented in the literature on discounting that small payoffs are discounted more heavily than
larger ones. This regularity is referred to as the magnitude effect (Frederick et al. 2002). Our approach
minimizes this effect.
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Table 2 Valuation of a Bee-Friendly Plant






Notes: In the first column, the monetary values that were presented to respondents in the second contingent
valuation study are displayed. Subjects were presented with only one out of the five possible values.
Subjects were asked whether they were willing to pay that particular amount to contribute one extra plant
to the project. The sample consisted of 81 subjects who were split between the five values. In the second
column, we display the corresponding acceptance percentages; that is, the percentage of subjects who
replied that they would be willing to pay that value to contribute one extra plant to the project
Each study consisted of 81 students of the University of Southampton. The first
contingent valuation study presented subjects with an open-ended question asking
them to indicate their maximum willingness to pay to contribute one extra plant to
the project. The purpose of this study was to allow for the calibration of the values
to be used in the second study. The median value of subjects’ responses was £5. The
top five modal values were utilized in the second contingent valuation study, which
presented subjects with only one out of the five possible values. Subjects were asked
whether they were willing to pay that particular amount to contribute one extra bee-
friendly plant to the project. The sample was split between the five values, with 17
subjects responding to the first value of £0.50, 15 subjects responding to the sec-
ond value of £2.50, 17 subjects responding to the third value of £5.00, 16 subjects
responding to the fourth value of £10.00 and 16 subjects responding to the final
value of £15.00. The different values presented to respondents and the corresponding
acceptance percentages are displayed in Table 2. We found that the mean willingness
to pay was approximately £4.98.9 This specific value was close enough to the median
response in the open-ended question of the first study. Consequently, we rounded the
number to the nearest pound, and implemented a conversion rate of 1 plant = £5. Sub-
jects were therefore presented with choices starting at £50 in the monetary domain
and 10 plants in the environmental domain. The plants that were distributed were
purchased for £3 to £5 each.
3.3 Tasks
All experimental sessions consisted of six stages with one task in each stage. Subjects
were informed of the total number of stages at the start of the experimental session,
9The mean willingness to pay was estimated using a probit model with the binary response (‘yes’ or ‘no’ to
the willingness to pay question) as the dependent variable and the monetary value displayed to the subject
as the only explanatory variable along with a constant term.
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but were introduced to the tasks of the stages as they progressed through the session.
The experimental sessions were conducted in the Social Sciences Experimental Lab
(SSEL) at the University of Southampton in March and April of 2014. The subjects
were recruited from the student population of the University of Southampton using
an electronic recruitment system. Subjects were allowed to participate in only one
session. A total of 118 students participated in the experiment. The split across gen-
der was almost even: 54% were men and 46% were women. The ages ranged from 18
to 28. The average age was 20 years old. The bigger portion of subjects (around 60%)
were pursuing an economics degree. Students pursuing a mathematics degree (around
12%) also had a large representation in the sample, as well as students pursuing a
philosophy degree (around 4%). The remaining 24% of the sample were students
studying to earn a degree in either English, history, modern languages, music, chem-
istry, law, health sciences and geography. Ninety-three percent of the subjects were
undergraduates; the rest pursued postgraduate studies. Each session had at most 16
subjects (this is the maximum capacity of the lab) and lasted approximately 45 min-
utes. The minimum number of subjects in a session was 13. The total number of
subjects in each subsample and the total number of sessions in each subsample are
displayed in the last two rows in Panel B of Table 1. Each participant received £5 as
a participation fee. The experimental codes were programmed using the experimen-
tal software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). The experimental instructions are provided
in the Online Appendix.
3.3.1 Monetary Discounting (MD) & Environmental Discounting (ED)
The Monetary Discounting (MD) task presented subjects with choices between a
smaller sooner amount and a larger later amount. The smaller sooner amount was
kept fixed at £50, whereas the larger later amount started at £55 and progressively
increased to £100 (i.e. £60, £65, £70, £75, £100). Subjects were presented with these
six choices for three different delay periods: (i) a 3-month delay period, (ii) a 6-month
delay period, and (iii) a 12-month delay period. Thus, in total subjects had to respond
to 6 × 3 = 18 questions. The implied hyperbolic discount-rate brackets in each of
the delay periods became progressively smaller. Note that the implied discount-rate
brackets were not provided to subjects. In total, we extracted three monetary discount
brackets for each subject.10 The binary choices and the implied hyperbolic discount-
rate brackets are displayed in Panel A of Table 3. To calculate the implied discount
rates, we used the hyperbolic formula ρ = 12(F/P − 1)/T , where ρ is the discount
rate, F is the future value, P is the present value and T is the time delay (in months)
between the present and the future value (Doyle 2013).11
10Around 92% of subjects had one switching point. Subjects who switched more than once in two or more
discounting tasks were excluded from the analysis on time preferences (see Section 4.1.1).
11Here, our objective is to investigate subjects’ intertemporal choices across the monetary domain and
the environmental domain. We remain agnostic as to the actual numerical value of the discount rate.
Calculating the actual discount rate is outside the scope of this study. Nevertheless, our qualitative results
are robust to consistent changes in the functional form across the two domains.
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Table 3 Binary Choices and Implied Discount-Rate Brackets
Panel A
Monetary Discounting (MD)
Binary Choice Hyperbolic Discount-Rate Brackets
Smaller sooner Larger later 3-month 6-month 12-month
(£) (£) (%) (%) (%)
50 55 / − 40 / − 20 / − 10
50 60 40 − 80 20 − 40 10 − 20
50 65 80 − 120 40 − 60 20 − 30
50 70 120 − 160 60 − 80 30 − 40
50 75 160 − 200 80 − 100 40 − 50
50 100 200 − 400 100 − 200 50 − 100
Panel B
Environmental Discounting (ED)
Binary Choice Hyperbolic Discount-Rate Brackets
Smaller sooner Larger later 3-month 6-month 12-month
(plants) (plants) (%) (%) (%)
10 11 / − 40 / − 20 / − 10
10 12 40 − 80 20 − 40 10 − 20
10 13 80 − 120 40 − 60 20 − 30
10 14 120 − 160 60 − 80 30 − 40
10 15 160 − 200 80 − 100 40 − 50
10 20 200 − 400 100 − 200 50 − 100
Notes: In Panel A, we display the binary choices and the implied hyperbolic discount-rate brackets in the
Monetary Discounting (MD) task. In Panel B, we display the binary choices and the implied hyperbolic
discount-rate brackets in the Environmental Discounting (ED) task
All the intertemporal choices presented to participants incorporated a front-end
delay as is standard practice in many such experimental studies. Rather than giving
subjects an earlier option that is payable at the end of the experimental session,
discounting experiments typically make use of a front-end delay where the smaller
sooner choice is itself delayed by a short time period (Coller and Williams 1999;
Andersen et al. 2008). The main advantage of this approach is that the front-end delay
safeguards against possible confounding effects caused by any perceived transaction
costs being associated with the larger later payment (Harrison and Lau 2005).
The payment method was designed to further reduce any perceived transaction
costs. Subjects were given a requisition form at the end of the experimental ses-
sion, which detailed their payoffs. The requisition form had to be dropped off at the
Finance Office (in the School of Social Sciences at the University of Southampton)
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and participants were paid by direct debit by the Finance Office on the date specified
on the form. The precise process was explained in the experimental instructions.
In the Environmental Discounting (ED) task, subjects were presented with the
same setup as in the MD task; that is, six binary choices were displayed for each of
the (three) different delay periods. Analogous to the task above, three environmen-
tal discount brackets were obtained for each subject. The only difference between
this task and the previous one is that subjects were presented with the environ-
mental instrument (i.e. plants) instead of money. The binary choices presented to
subjects and the implied hyperbolic discount-rate brackets are displayed in Panel B
of Table 3.
3.3.2 Monetary Risk Aversion Test (MRAT) & Environmental Risk Aversion Test
(ERAT)
The two tests served to elicit subjects’ risk aversion in the monetary domain and
the environmental domain. We used a variant of the Eckel-Grossman test (Eckel and
Grossman 2002, 2008), where subjects were presented with five gambles of varying
riskiness and were required to select the one they prefer. All gambles had two possible
outcomes: Outcome X with 50% likelihood and Outcome Y with 50% likelihood;
that is, both outcomes were equiprobable. In addition, the expected payoffs were easy
to calculate and the increasing variance as the gambles got riskier was significantly
large to be noticeable. This test is a simplified version of the one designed by Holt
and Laury (2002), but it still elicits sufficient heterogeneity in subjects’ responses
(Eckel and Grossman 2008).
The Monetary Risk Aversion Test (MRAT) was set at a magnitude level that
was comparable to the choices given to subjects in the discounting tasks. The gam-
bles started at an option with identical outcomes (i.e. a gain of £50) and moved
to options of increasing variance at the point where the last option’s equiprobable
outcomes were £5 and £162.50. Expected payoffs increased as you moved down
the table, so choices further down indicated lower risk aversion. The Environmen-
tal Risk Aversion Test (ERAT) was matched in magnitude to the MRAT at the same
conversion rate of money per plant (£5 per plant) used in the discounting tasks. Anal-
ogous to the MRAT, the first option had identical outcomes, whereas the last option’s
equiprobable outcomes were 1 plant and 33 plants. The lists of gambles presented
in the MRAT and the ERAT are displayed in Panel A and Panel B, respectively,
in Table 4.
3.3.3 Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) & Questionnaire (Q)
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) was proposed by Frederick (2005) as a way
of measuring a specific type of cognitive ability—that of suppressing a spontaneous
response in favor of a more deliberately-thought-out one. The CRT consists of 3 ques-
tions. In order to successfully complete the CRT subjects were required to question
their initial response and devote some cognitive power to realize that it was incorrect
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Table 4 Risk Aversion Tests
Panel A
Monetary Risk Aversion Test (MRAT)
Option Outcome Payoffs Probability
(£)
1 X 50.00 50%
Y 50.00 50%
2 X 35.00 50%
Y 87.50 50%
3 X 25.00 50%
Y 112.50 50%
4 X 15.00 50%
Y 137.50 50%
5 X 5.00 50%
Y 162.50 50%
Panel B
Environmental Risk Aversion Test (ERAT)
Option Outcome Payoffs Probability
(plants)
1 X 10 plants 50%
Y 10 plants 50%
2 X 7 plants 50%
Y 18 plants 50%
3 X 5 plants 50%
Y 23 plants 50%
4 X 3 plants 50%
Y 28 plants 50%
5 X 1 plant 50%
Y 33 plants 50%
Notes: Panel A displays the Monetary Risk Aversion Test (MRAT). Panel B displays the Environmental
Risk Aversion Test (ERAT). Both panels follow the same structure. In the first column, the 5 options
available to subjects are listed. In the second column, the possible outcomes of each option are listed:
Outcome X or Outcome Y. In the third column, the payoffs associated with each outcome in each option
are listed. Note that the inability to express decimals in plants led us to the rounding up of payoffs in this
domain. In column four, the probability of that specific outcome occurring is listed
and, consequently, arrive at the correct answer. The inclusion of the CRT task allows
us to capture the heterogeneity in subjects’ reflective ability. More specifically,
cognitive ability could plausibly be increasingly relevant to the evaluation of
intertemporal (monetary and environmental) choices and (monetary and environmen-
tal) risk aversion. The three CRT questions are included in the Online Appendix.
Finally, in the last stage, we administered the Questionnaire (Q). The question-
naire consisted of questions of socio-demographic nature as well as 17 questions
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taken from the Segmentation Model developed by DEFRA (2008) 12 The latter part
pertained to subjects’ values, attitudes and motivations as well as current behaviors
and barriers to change. In addition, the questions covered topics such as climate
change, recycling, transportation and water use. The Q was administered in the last
stage in order to remove any unintentional impact these questions might have on the
environmental intertemporal choices and environmental risk aversion of subjects.
3.4 Payment mechanism
The experimental design applied a variant of the random-lottery incentive scheme,
where subjects make a number of decisions knowing that, at the end of the experi-
mental session, one of these decisions will be selected for payment. There is a vast
literature testing the validity of this payment scheme. Laury (2005) found that sub-
jects do not scale down decisions when they are only being paid for a subset of
these decisions. Along the same lines, Cubitt et al. (1998) confirmed that such design
does not contaminate elicited preferences. Hey and Lee (2005) showed that subjects
separate the various questions and respond to each question individually and in iso-
lation from the rest; thus, incentives are retained. Recently, Andersen et al. (2014)
find no evidence that the use of probabilistic payment schemes on discount rates
changes behavior relative to that in a fully-paid experiment. An added value of this
approach is that it neutralizes the income effect that would otherwise be experienced
as subjects progress through the periods. Our approach was to apply a double layered
random-lottery incentive payment scheme. More specifically, two subjects in each
experimental session were randomly selected to be paid for their choices. The first
subject selected was paid for either the choice made in the MD task or the choice
made in the ED task, where each task had an equal probability of being selected.
Once the domain was selected, one of the 18 questions was drawn and the subject’s
choice in that question was paid (with money or plants accordingly). The second sub-
ject selected was paid for either the choice made in the MRAT or the choice made in
the ERAT, where each test had an equal probability of being selected. Once the test
was selected, an outcome was drawn (X or Y where each outcome had an equal prob-
ability of being selected) and the subject was paid (with money or plants accordingly)
based on the gamble chosen.
The random selection was carried out using a bingo machine that was prominently
displayed in the lab. Bingo balls were placed on subjects’ desks with the terminal
ID number on the ball. Subjects placed the balls into the bingo machine themselves
at the end of the experimental session and witnessed the random selection. This was
12The model segments the population into seven behavioral groups using a number of questions on envi-
ronmental attitudes and the respondents’ age. DEFRA has developed this model in order to further advance
behavioral change through social marketing strategies that target specific segments of the population.
Their objective is to achieve a more environmentally-friendly lifestyle for the public. Segmentation mod-
els are a popular way of investigating the behavior of individuals as it pertains to specific functions of
their everyday life, such as transportation choices and water consumption. The advantage of the DEFRA
model is that it targets attitudes towards many different environmental sectors, thus achieving a classifica-
tion that captures an individual’s overall attitude to issues of an environmental nature (Jesson 2009; Barr
et al. 2011).
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necessary to ensure complete transparency of the process. However, the choices of
the subjects selected were not revealed to the other subjects as that would violate the
confidentiality with respect to their earnings.
3.5 General hypotheses
Based on the existing literature (Hardisty and Weber 2009), we first hypothesize
that the domain has no impact on subjects’ intertemporal choices. This hypothesis
is tested by comparing the intertemporal choices taken in the monetary domain with
those taken in the environmental domain. The first hypothesis is thus formulated as
follows.
H1: Subjects’ intertemporal choices are the same across the monetary domain and
the environmental domain.
In an analogous manner, we hypothesize that subjects’ risk aversion is not
influenced by the domain. The second hypothesis is stated next.
H2: Subjects’ risk aversion is the same across the monetary domain and the
environmental domain.
Our last hypothesis is formulated to determine whether there exists some degree
of correlation between the two decision types within a domain.
H3: Subjects’ intertemporal choices correlate with their risk aversion within a
domain.
4 Results
The three hypotheses are formally tested next. Each hypothesis is matched with the
corresponding result; that is, result i is a report on the test of hypothesis i.
4.1 Descriptive statistics
4.1.1 Time preferences
Recall that subjects had to decide on the switching point in the 3-month delay
period, the 6-month delay period, and the 12-month delay period for both the mon-
etary and the environmental domains. Subjects that switched twice within the same
time-delay period in two or more discounting tasks were taken out of the data anal-
ysis on time preferences. A total of 10 subjects were excluded leaving us with 108
observations.
We next present the switching distribution of subjects in the three delay periods
in the monetary domain and in the three delay periods in the environmental domain.
This information is displayed in Fig. 1. An individual with a binary choice of 1
in the monetary domain chose the larger later amount of £55 in lieu of the earlier
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Fig. 1 Switching Distribution. Notes: We display on the left the relative frequency of subjects’ switching
distributions across the discounting tasks in the monetary domain. We display on the right the relative
frequency of subjects’ switching distributions across the discounting tasks in the environmental domain.
An individual with a binary choice of 1 in the monetary domain chose the larger later amount of £55 in
lieu of the earlier smaller amount of £50, and an individual with a binary choice of 1 in the environmental
domain chose the larger later amount of 11 plants in lieu of the earlier smaller amount of 10 plants. An
individual with a binary choice of 7 in either the monetary or the environmental domain always chose the
earlier smaller amount
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Table 5 Discounting Patterns Across Domains
Time Delay: 3-month 6-month 12-month
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
Constant discounting across domains 27 25 29 27 42 39
Higher environmental discounting 46 43 48 44 35 32
Lower environmental discounting 35 32 31 29 31 29
Total 108 108 108
Notes: We display information on subjects’ discounting behavior in the monetary domain and the
environmental domain while controlling for the time delay
smaller amount of £50, and an individual with a binary choice of 1 in the environ-
mental domain chose the larger later amount of 11 plants in lieu of the earlier smaller
amount of 10 plants. An individual with a binary choice of 7 in either the mone-
tary or the environmental domain always chose the earlier smaller amount. The mean
switch in the 3-month delay period (MD 3.8/ED 4.0) implies an annual discount-
rate bracket between 80% and 160%. The mean switch in the 6-month delay period
(MD 5.1/ED 5.3) implies an average discount-rate bracket between 80% and 200%.
Finally, the mean switch in the 12-month delay period (MD 5.5/ED 5.7) implies an
average discount-rate bracket between 40% and 100%.
We next allocate subjects into three categories based on their discounting behav-
ior in the monetary domain and the environmental domain while controlling for
the time delay. More specifically, we provide the frequency and percentage of
subjects that exhibited one of the three discounting patterns: (i) constant discount-
ing across domains, (ii) higher discounting in the environmental domain, and (iii)
lower discounting in the environmental domain. The findings are displayed in
Table 5. Over the three time-delay periods, on average, the number of subjects
that exhibited a constant discounting behavior across the two domains was 30%.
Forty percent of the subjects exhibited a higher discount rate in the environmental
domain, and 30% of the subjects exhibited a lower discount rate in the environmental
domain.
4.1.2 Risk aversion
In the tests on risk aversion, subjects were given five gambles to choose from, where
each gamble featured two possible outcomes: Outcome X with 50% likelihood and
Outcome Y with 50% likelihood. The gambles started at a non-degenerate gamble
and moved to degenerate gambles of increasing variance and expected payoffs. In
the Monetary Risk Aversion Test (MRAT), 18% of subjects chose the non-degenerate
gamble, 59% of subjects chose one of the next two gambles, while the remaining 23%
chose one of the last two gambles. In the Environmental Risk Aversion Test (ERAT),
28% of subjects chose the non-degenerate gamble, 54% of subjects chose one of the
next two gambles, and the remaining 18% chose one of the last two gambles. The
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Fig. 2 Distribution of Risk Aversion. Notes: We display on the left the relative frequency of subjects’
gambles across the MRAT. We display on the right the relative frequency of subjects’ gambles across the
ERAT. Binary choices indicate the gambles chosen by the subjects
relative frequency of subjects’ gambles across the MRAT and ERAT is displayed in
Fig. 2.
4.1.3 Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) & Questionnaire (Q)
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) aims to measure subjects’ reflective ability. The
test requires subjects to answer three questions, where each question has 4 possible
answers. The CRT score consists of one positive point for every correct answer given.
The score therefore ranges from 0 to 3. Thirty-four percent of the subjects answered
all three questions correctly, while 18% of subjects got all three questions wrong.
The spread of scores suggests a dispersion of reflective ability amongst subjects. The
distribution for the CRT is shown in Fig. 3.
The questionnaire consisted of socio-demographic questions as well as 17 ques-
tions taken from the Segmentation Model developed by DEFRA (2008). The
questions from the Segmentation Model are provided in Table 6. The model segments
the respondents into seven behavioral groups. The frequencies and corresponding
percentages of the seven groups are displayed in Table 7. The first four groups are
considered pro-environmental. In our sample, almost 78% of the respondents belong
to one of the top four pro-environmental groups. We further classify subjects that
belong to the top four groups as exhibiting environmental awareness.
4.2 Order effects
The principal drawback of a ‘within-subject’ experimental design is the possibility
that the order in which the subjects are presented with the tasks might influence
their choices. Recall that in our setup, we allowed for four subsamples: A1, A2, B1
and B2 (see Table 1). In Table 8, we use the Bonferroni adjustment, which corrects
for multiple comparisons in the p-values to determine whether subjects’ choice in a
specific task differs (i = j ) across the pairwise, subsample comparison. Rejecting
the null would imply that the setup is confounded with order effects. Yet, our design
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Table 6 Segmentation model
Questions
I would only travel by bus if I had no other choice. (PG:3.25; WW:5.33; CC:2.91; SS:6.23; CP:4.14;
StSt:5.08; HD:5.48)
For the sake of the environment, car users should pay higher taxes. (PG:5.33; WW:1.87; CC:3.07; SS:3.00;
CP:4.90; StSt:3.43; HD:2.62)
People who fly should bear the cost of the environmental damage that air travel causes. (PG:7.44;
WW:3.51; CC:4.63; SS:5.15; CP:6.84; StSt:4.70; HD:3.13)
I don’t pay much attention to the amount of water I use. (PG:5.11; WW:4.71; CC:5.48; SS:11.22; CP:6.04;
StSt:10.01; HD:8.59)
People have a duty to recycle. (PG:17.90; WW:17.37; CC:16.80; SS:17.25; CP:17.03; StSt:17.87;
HD:13.30)
We are close to the limit of the number of people that earth can support. (PG:5.23; WW:5.91; CC:2.70;
SS:5.60; CP:5.13; StSt:6.64; HD:4.48)
The earth has very limited room and resources. (PG:10.90; WW:9.28; CC:6.73; SS:9.77; CP:8.58;
StSt:8.94; HD:7.09)
If things continue on their current course, we will soon experience a major environmental disaster.
(PG:15.70; WW:13.51; CC:13.19; SS:15.31; CP:14.75; StSt:16.59; HD:11.19)
The so-called ‘environmental crisis’ facing humanity has been greatly exaggerated. (PG:7.18; WW:11.42;
CC:9.54; SS:8.91; CP:9.77; StSt:12.98; HD:11.94)
It would embarrass me if my friends thought my lifestyle was purposefully environmentally friendly.
(PG:1.67; WW:3.23; CC:3.24; SS:3.74; CP:6.06; StSt:8.55; HD:5.34)
Being green is an alternative lifestyle, it’s not for the majority. (PG:2.71; WW:4.71; CC:4.27; SS:6.24;
CP:5.56; StSt:8.12; HD:6.61)
I find it hard to change my habits to be more environmentally friendly. (PG:6.77; WW:7.12; CC:7.03;
SS:9.47; CP:9.60; StSt:11.89; HD:9.77)
It’s only worth doing environmentally-friendly things if they save you money. (PG:3.02; WW:4.54;
CC:4.93; SS:4.72; CP:6.73; StSt:11.29; HD:7.84)
The effects of climate change are too far in the future to really worry me. (PG:0.46; WW:3.17; CC:2.80;
SS:3.56; CP:4.03; StSt:9.34; HD:6.87)
It’s not worth me doing things to help the environment if others don’t do the same. (PG:1.19; WW:2.71;
CC:2.66; SS:3.42; CP:5.91; StSt:8.09; HD:6.58)
It’s not worth Britain trying to combat climate change, other countries will just cancel what we do.
(PG:1.18; WW:5.94; CC:1.70; SS:3.53; CP:5.25; StSt:6.21; HD:5.33)
Which of these best describes how you feel about your current lifestyle and the environment? (PG:7.41;
WW:3.01; CC:5.56; SS:5.44; CP:6.19; StSt:3.37; HD:2.53)
Notes: We display the questions of the Segmentation Model that classifies respondents into Positive
Greens (PG), Waste Watchers (WW), Concerned Consumers (CC), Sideline Supporters (SS), Cautious Par-
ticipants (CP), Stalled Starters (StSt) and Honestly Disengaged (HD). Each respondent receives 7 scores,
one for each behavioral group. The respondent is placed in the group with the highest score. The score of
the group is calculated as follows: (i) multiply the unique group coefficient of each question (indicated in
brackets) with a scale from 0 to 1 based on the respondent’s corresponding answer (‘Strongly agree’=1,
‘Tend to agree’=0.75, ‘Neither agree nor disagree’=0.5, ‘Don’t know’=0.25, and ‘Strongly disagree’=0;
in the last question, the possible responses were: ‘I’d like to do a lot more to help the environment’=1,
‘I’d like to do a bit more to help the environment’=0.5, ‘I’m happy with what I do at the moment’=0, and
‘Don’t know’=0.5), (ii) sum the group’s products of the 17 questions, (iii) add to the sum in (ii) the prod-
uct of the respondent’s age (16-29=1, 30-40=2, 41-54=3, 55-64=4, and 65+=5) and the group’s coefficient
(PG:1.70, WW:1.75, CC:1.48, SS:1.64, CP:1.53, StSt:1.62, HD:1.50), and (iv) add to (iii) the group’s
constant (PG:−35.32, WW:−34.28; CC:−26.89, SS:−40.44, CP:−40.02, StSt:−56.70, HD:−35.45)
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Table 7 Behavioral groups
Groups Freq. %
Positive Greens 39 33.1
Waste Watchers 6 5.1
Concerned Consumers 30 25.4
Sideline Supporters 16 13.6
Cautious Participants 12 10.2
Stalled Starters 6 5.1
Honestly Disengaged 9 7.6
Notes: We classify the 118 respondents into 7 behavioral groups based on the Segmentation Model
developed by DEFRA (2008)
does not seem to be susceptible to order effects. Consistency checks using the Sˇida´k
and the Scheffe´ adjustments yield similar results.
4.3 Domain differences
The first hypothesis aims to determine whether a change in domain has an effect
on subjects’ intertemporal choices. We first test our hypothesis using a standard χ2-
test, where the H0 states that the intertemporal choices across the monetary and the
environmental domains are similar when controlling for the time delay. The results
are displayed in Table 9, where we report the p-values in the full sample and each
Fig. 3 Distribution of CRT Scores. Notes: We report the relative frequency of subjects’ CRT scores. The
CRT score consists of one positive point for every correct answer given
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Table 8 Order effects
Subsamples A2/A1 B1/A2 B1/A1 B2/B1 B2/A2 B2/A1
Alternative hypothesis: choicei = choicej
p-values
Time Preferences
MD (3-month delay) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.196 0.083
MD (6-month delay) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.511 0.326
MD (12-month delay) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.625
ED (3-month delay) 0.781 1.000 1.000 0.869 0.264 0.251
ED (6-month delay) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.165
ED (12-month delay) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.429 0.240
Risk Aversion
MRAT 0.910 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
ERAT 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.413 0.145
Notes: We use the Bonferroni adjustment, which corrects for multiple comparisons in the p-values to
determine whether subjects’ choice in a specific task differs (i = j ) across the pairwise, subsample
comparison. MD is the acronym for Monetary Discounting, ED for Environmental Discounting, MRAT
for Monetary Risk Aversion Test, and ERAT for Environmental Risk Aversion Test
subsample. The χ2-test does not find any significant differences in discounting across
domains; thus, we cannot reject the H0.
Moreover, given the repeated nature of the tasks undertaken, we also run two
mixed-effects ordered probit regressions in Table 10 with subjects’ intertemporal
choices as the categorical dependent variable. For the probit regressions, we uti-
lized the full sample as such regressions require a sufficiently large sample size;
otherwise the statistical power of the test is significantly compromised. Domain is
an explanatory dummy regression variable, which takes the value of 1 if the risk
aversion has been obtained from the ERAT and 0 if the risk aversion has been
obtained from the MRAT. We investigate two specifications: Model 1 and Model 2.
Model 1 incorporates only the domain dummy. Model 2 builds upon the first model
Table 9 χ2-tests on domain differences in time preferences
Subsamples All A1 A2 B1 B2
Alternative hypothesis: MD = ED
p-values
3-month 0.192 0.100 0.404 0.354 0.442
6-month 0.256 0.728 0.888 0.346 0.164
12-month 0.328 0.222 0.403 0.802 0.359
Notes: We report p-values from the χ2-test in the full sample and each subsample, where the H0 states
that the discounting behavior across the across the monetary (MD) and the environmental domains (ED)
is similar when controlling for the time delay.
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Table 10 Mixed-effects ordered probit results on domain differences in time preferences













Notes: A subject’s intertemporal choice is the categorical dependent variable. The two models vary in
the number of explanatory variables included. ‘Domain’ is a dummy that takes the value of 1 in the
environmental domain and 0 in the monetary domain, ‘Gender’ is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if
the subject is female and 0 otherwise, ‘Domain × Gender’ is an interaction variable for the previous two
dummies, ‘Own home’ is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the subject’s parents own their home and 0
otherwise, ‘Environmental awareness’ is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the subject belongs in one of
the top four, pro-environmental groups of DEFRA (2008) and 0 otherwise, and ‘High CRT’ is a dummy
that takes the value of 1 if the subject scored at least 2 questions correctly on the CRT and 0 otherwise. All
standard errors are reported in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level ** Significant at the 5% level
*** Significant at the 1% level
by adding a gender variable, an interaction variable between gender and domain, a
variable on whether the subject’s parents own their home, a variable on whether the
subject belongs in one of the top four, pro-environmental groups of DEFRA (2008)
(i.e. exhibits environmental awareness), and a variable on whether the subject scored
at least 2 questions correctly on the CRT. The earlier findings are confirmed; that is,
no significant differences in subjects’ intertemporal choices seem to exist across the
monetary and the environmental domains. Our findings are formalized next in our
first main result.13
R1: Subjects’ intertemporal choices are the same across the monetary and the
environmental domains.
13Recall that the experimental data on the repeated binary intertemporal choices are transformed into a
single switching point; the latter produces a discount-rate interval, which contains the indifference point of
each subject. Given that the data is of an interval nature and this feature is not captured by the above test, we
also run an interval regression, which allows for the specification of the (discount-rate) brackets presented
to participants as the dependent variable. More specifically, it allows for the first and last brackets to be
open; therefore, the first bracket has no minimum value and the last bracket has no maximum value. The
interval regression is run on the log of the discount rates with domain as an explanatory dummy variable,
which takes the value of 1 for discounting in the environmental domain and 0 otherwise. The latter model
confirms the aforementioned main result.
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Table 11 χ2-test on domain differences in risk aversion
Subsamples All A1 A2 B1 B2
Alternative hypothesis: MRAT = ERAT
p-values
0.011 0.070 0.438 0.328 0.037
Notes: We utilize the χ2-test in the full sample and each subsample to determine whether subjects’ choices
on gambles are the same across the two domains
The second hypothesis aims to determine whether a change in domain has an
impact on subjects’ risk aversion. We thus run a standard χ2-test to examine whether
subjects’ choices on gambles are the same across domains using the full sample as
well as each subsample. Table 11 shows the results of the test. In two of the four sub-
samples (A1 and B2), there exists evidence to suggest of a domain effect in subjects’
choices on gambles. In the full sample, we see that the H0 is rejected at the 5% level
of statistical significance; thus, there exists a domain effect on subjects’ risk aversion.
In addition, analogous to the aforementioned analysis, we also run two mixed-
effects ordered probit regressions in Table 12 with subjects’ choices in the tests on
risk aversion as the categorical dependent variable. Crucially, we find that subjects
exhibit a higher degree of risk aversion in the environmental domain relative to the
monetary domain.14 These findings culminate in our second main result.
R2: Subjects’ risk aversion is statistically different across the monetary and the
environmental domains. Specifically, subjects exhibit higher levels of risk aversion
in the environmental domain.
Furthermore, it is important to observe that in Model 2 of Table 12, the domain
and gender regressors are both significant, while the interaction regressor (domain
× gender) is not. This implies that both men and women exhibit higher levels of
risk aversion in the environmental domain than in the monetary one, and that women
exhibit higher levels of risk aversion than men in both the monetary and the envi-
ronmental domains. The finding that women are more risk averse than men in the
monetary domain corroborates existing results due to Eckel and Grossman (2002).
Crucially, we show this finding to also hold in the environmental domain. Finally,
we find that neither time preferences nor risk aversion is correlated with CRT or
environmental awareness across the two domains.15
4.4 Time preferences & risk aversion
Part of the motivation for discounting future outcomes rests on the element of risk
introduced by the time delay. It is possible that time and risk preferences are driven
14A negative coefficient indicates an increase in the likelihood that a subject will choose one of the earlier
(safer) gambles, thereby displaying a higher degree of risk aversion.
15This is a departure from the findings of Frederick (2005). We conjecture that differences in the
experimental design (Frederick’s design was not incentivized) can account for the divergence.
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Table 12 Mixed-effects ordered probit results on domain differences in risk aversion













Notes: A subject’s choice in the risk aversion task is the categorical dependent variable. The two models
vary in the number of explanatory variables included. ‘Domain’ is a dummy that takes the value of 1 in
the environmental domain and 0 in the monetary domain, ‘Gender’ is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if
the subject is female and 0 otherwise, ‘Domain × Gender’ is an interaction variable for the previous two
dummies, ‘Own home’ is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the subject’s parents own their home and 0
otherwise, ‘Environmental awareness’ is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the subject belongs in one of
the top four, pro-environmental groups of DEFRA (2008) and 0 otherwise, and ‘High CRT’ is a dummy
that takes the value of 1 if the subject scored at least 2 questions correctly on the CRT and 0 otherwise. All
standard errors are reported in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level ** Significant at the 5% level
*** Significant at the 1% level
by similar processes. Ferecatu and O¨ncu¨ler (2016) find evidence that the more risk
averse subjects were also more patient. Therefore, we examine next whether the
two decision types are correlated within a domain. The mixed-effects ordered probit
regression is displayed in Table 13. A subject’s choice in the risk aversion task is
the categorical dependent variable. The explanatory variables are the switches of
the three delay periods; that is, the 3-month, 6-month, and 12-month. We find no
significant correlation between the risk aversion variable and any of the discounting
variables. This implies that there is no evidence of an individual’s intertemporal
choices being related to their choices on risk aversion, which culminates in our last
main result.
R3: Subjects’ intertemporal choices show no correlation with their risk aversion
within a domain.
5 Concluding remarks
We study experimentally subjects’ time preferences and risk aversion across two
domains: the monetary domain and the environmental domain. Our study is the
first to utilize an incentivized experimental design: in the monetary domain, time
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Notes: A subject’s choice in the risk aversion task is the categorical dependent variable. The 3-month
switch is a categorical variable representing the choice made in the 3-month delay period. The 6-month
switch is a categorical variable representing the choice made in the 6-month delay period. The 12-month
switch is a categorical variable representing the choice made in the 12-month delay period. All standard
errors are reported in parentheses
preferences and risk aversion are elicited with real monetary payoffs, whereas in
the environmental domain, time preferences and risk aversion are elicited using real,
bee-friendly plants. Contrasting subjects’ intertemporal choices across the monetary
and environmental domains, we find that subjects’ discounting behavior is not sta-
tistically different. In sharp contrast, subjects’ risk aversion is significantly different
across the monetary domain and the environmental domain; specifically, subjects
tend to be unwilling to take on large gambles when it comes to bee-friendly plants.
This result is not gender-specific; that is, both men and women exhibit a higher
degree of risk aversion in the environmental domain relative to the monetary domain.
Moreover, we find that women are more risk averse than men in both the monetary
and the environmental domains. Finally, given that part of the motivation to discount
future outcomes stems from an element of risk, which is introduced by the time delay,
we hypothesize that subjects’ intertemporal choices correlate with their risk aversion
within a domain. Our analysis reveals no such correlation within a domain.
Ideally, these results ought to be evaluated across three important dimensions. First
and foremost, the study should be replicated in a more representative sample given
that the present sample consisted only of university students. Second, time prefer-
ences and risk aversion in the environmental domain should be tested using other
environmental instruments and compared to time preferences and risk aversion in
the monetary domain to determine the robustness of the aforementioned findings.
For instance, it would be interesting to include instruments that are closer to resem-
bling private goods, such as energy-saving light bulbs or even instruments that confer
little private benefit to the recipient, such as supporting endangered species. Third,
time preferences and risk aversion should be tested across a much broader array of
domains to identify domain-specificity where such exists. Such fruitful attempts have
been undertaken in the recent studies of Tsukayama and Duckworth (2010); Einav
et al. (2012), and Ubfal (2016). The current research highlights that a direct map-
ping of results from the monetary domain to the environmental domain is risky. We
believe the same holds true for other domains.
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